

With regard to  
M. D. Pickett  
[Lexington, Ky.]

[to Genl. D.C. Govan]

**SKETCH**

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OF THE

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**MILITARY CAREER**

OF

**William J. Hardee**

**Lieutenant-General C. S. A.**

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WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF THE  
TENNESSEE HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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BY  
**W. D. PICKETT**  
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LEXINGTON, KY.  
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# SKETCH OF THE MILITARY CAREER OF WILLIAM J. HARDEE

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The letter following will explain itself:

HEADQUARTERS TENNESSEE HISTORICAL SOCIETY  
NASHVILLE, February 2nd, 1910.

COL. W. D. PICKETT,  
*Lexington, Kentucky,*

DEAR SIR:

Our State Historical Society is engaged in the laudable undertaking of procuring, collating and preserving in its archives, all of the principal events, incidents, etc., connected with and pertaining to, the late war between the States, so far as it may be possible, and also a short biographical sketch of the principal actors, both civil and military, who were engaged in that great struggle, so that posterity may have—approximately at least—a fair and honest presentation of our—the Southern side—of the many questions that were involved in this war and settled by it.

Among the many military men of this class we find the name of that patriotic, brave and excellent Corps Commander, Lieutenant General William J. Hardee, of whom, I am sorry to say, so little has been said and written by the gatherers and compilers of Confederate History.

Such should not longer be allowed to be the case, relative to him, for there is no one of his rank in the Southern army, more entitled or more worthy of honorable mention and remembrance than General Hardee.

Our Society then, believing, and in fact knowing, that at this time, and likely at no other time, there is no one better suited and qualified, than yourself, to make a correct presentation of the life and character of General H., I am directed to present the matter to you and to ask that you furnish such a sketch of him as you think his life, both private and military, would justify you to make. The Society would greatly appreciate the favor and would be well pleased to have the manuscript filed among its records and archives for reference and aid to future historians and antiquaries. I think it is a duty we owe to posterity to hand down to the extent of our ability, a correct and comprehensive compendium of Con-



federate history together with the estimate that contemporaries placed upon the leading characters connected with that history.

This is why our Society is taking such an active interest along this line. Believing that you entertain a like opinion, is our excuse for making this application at this time.

Hoping that it may be both pleasant and convenient for you to comply with this request

I remain with high regard,

Your obedient servant,

GEORGE C. PORTER.

In compliance to the request conveyed by Colonel Porter in a manner so flattering, the writer reluctantly accepts the task assigned by this distinguished society and begs leave to append a summary of such events and acts that have a bearing on the subject matter of this paper. The task is not a pleasant one, recalling as it does, the many hardships and horrors of that bloody struggle; and worse still, there is recalled the loss of the long list of noble spirits, that succumbed in battle or the hospital.

Having served on the staff of this distinguished officer from January 4, 1862, to the end, (the surrender and parole of the army under General Jo. E. Johnston, at Greensboro, N. C., on the 26th of April, 1865, about three and a half years) it would seem, that he had exceptional opportunities for the task assigned him.

On the other hand, an opinion might be entertained by some, that any sketch of the military career of a General officer by one of his staff, associated with him for more than three years, amid the hardships and horrors of actual war, would naturally show so much bias as to be unreliable.

For that reason, what follows will be confined to General Hardee's military record and will be based on the writer's personal observation and upon facts that are of record and that have passed into history.

You very properly deplore, that the so-called "gatherers and compilers of Confederate history" have little to say of the services of such a prominent actor in that conflict as William J. Hardee, and you might have added, the names of many other distinguished officers.

Your opinion is more than emphasized after inspecting a much advertised painting, styled "Lee and his Generals," some of whose figures overshadow that of the great Lee himself. You fail to recognize such faces as Hardee, or Cleburne, or Cheatham, or Bate or other distinguished officers of the Army of Tennessee. On the contrary there are faces on that canvass that were scarcely heard of, whilst "the fight was on."

This should not be so. The Tennessee Historical Society are engaged in a noble work and should be encouraged in every way by the survivors of that struggle.

William J. Hardee was by instinct a soldier. Upon this natural instinct was grafted the advantages of a four-years' study and training at the West Point Military Academy. This was followed by active service in the field during the entire war with Mexico, during which he earned honorable distinction and received commensurate promotion.

Afterwards he was for several years the Commandant of the Corps of Cadets at West Point. Either during this command or subsequent thereto, he was ordered to visit Europe, study the military tactics of their several armies and to compile an "up-to-date" system of tactics for the infantry and cavalry of the United States Army. The result of his labors, compiled from the highest European standards, was adopted by his government and published with his name attached. "Hardee's System of Tactics" was followed by each of the opposing armies during the subsequent war between the states.

This training in the art military heretofore outlined, was invaluable to him afterwards, when in command of large bodies of troops in that conflict. Hardee realized to the fullest extent, that the soldier, the man that carried the musket and did the shooting and used the bayonet in battle, must be well shod and clothed and well fed and kept in health. This impressed upon him the importance of a well organized commissary department and quartermaster department. He must be furnished with a good shooting iron, with an abundance of ammunition. This necessitated a well organized ordnance department. Then last, but not least, there must be a well organized medical department to take care of the sick and wounded. The soldier, in going into battle, if killed no matter; but if wounded he must believe that just in his rear is a surgeon and corps of brave and stalwart litter bearers, to give temporary relief, bear him to the rear to a field hospital and thence to some general hospital where his wounds can be attended to and his other wants supplied.

As a means for carrying to success all movements of the corps Hardee surrounded himself with a corps of courageous and efficient staff officers, adjutant, department of orders, inspection department to see that orders were carried out and so with commissary, quartermaster, ordnance and medical departments.

Hardee realized more than most commanding officers, that a soldier in going into battle must have the utmost confidence in his superior officers. He must know from past experience that in going into battle all his wants will be provided for and that



he will not be uselessly exposed. Then he goes in with a stomach to win. On the contrary, if he realizes around him a half-hazard organization, he loses confidence in his higher officers and it tells in the day's fighting.

The principal cause of Hardee's success in battle, is that he at all times commanded the respect of his subordinates, from the Division Commander to the man in the ranks who carried the musket. His corps was always a unit, all inspired with the loftiest patriotism and with the utmost confidence in their commander.

This mutual confidence and unity of feeling among the constituent elements of the corps, is the main cause of its uniform success in battle. In all the battles of this corps, when under his command; Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Missionary Ridge, all the engagements of the Atlanta campaign ending with the fall of the latter city, this corps never turned its back to the foe in battle. During the battle of Chickamauga this corps was commanded by General D. H. Hill, Hardee being on detached service in Mississippi, since the middle of July. Can more or as much be said of any corps of the entire Confederate Army?

General Hardee realized from the beginning, the magnitude of the war in which the South was engaged. Having spent quite a number of years at West Point and Washington he realized the power and resources of the North and had no sympathy with the foolish idea that prevailed too much after the battle of the first "Bull Run" that one Southerner was equal to five "Yanks," a feeling of over confidence that contributed much to our failure.

In the spring of 1861 Hardee was commissioned by the Confederate War Department as Colonel of Cavalry and given the Command of Fort Morgan, protecting Mobile. He was soon promoted as Brigadier General and given Command of the organized troops west of the Mississippi river.

In the early fall of 1861, the Federal government commenced concentrating an army at Munfordsville, Kentucky, on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, under Command of General D. C. Buell.

To meet this movement General Albert Sydney Johnston, Commanding the Western Department, transferred Hardee's Command as rapidly as possible to Bowling Green, Kentucky, about forty miles south of Munfordsville. This force together with troops, raised in Kentucky by General S. B. Buckner formed the nucleus of what was designated "The Army of Central Kentucky." W. J. Hardee promoted to Major General as Commander. As Bowling Green appeared the most vulnerable point in the Confederate line of defense, General Johnston's headquarters were transferred from Columbus to that point. (See Appendix C.)

The campaign in the West of 1862, opened with the following dispositions of the opposing forces. The right of the Confederate line under Hardee was at Bowling Green, Ky., with an effective total of, not exceeding, 22,000 infantry and artillery. Opposing him at Munfordsville was the Federal Army, under General Buell, of 40,000 men, as reported. The left of the Confederate line was at Columbus, Ky., on the Mississippi river, under General Polk, with about 13,000 men. Confronting Polk at Cairo was General Grant, with an army of from 15,000 to 20,000 men. Columbus had been made impregnable from an attack by water, by a system of batteries covering about one mile of the river front. The position might be taken in rear, by landing a superior force at Paducah, with a short march by land.

The center of the Confederate line was on the Tennessee river, near the mouth of Sandy and was defended by an earth work fort, mounting eleven heavy guns, Fort Henry.

The opposite side of the river was wanting, in any proper defensive work as had been ordered, by General Johnston. It is understood the rear of this Fort was commanded by ground in the rear. Fort Donelson, a fort opposite on the Cumberland river had a stronger natural position and was so well defended by effective batteries, as subsequently, to repulse an attack of the gun boats and compelled General Grant to reduce the field work in the rear, before its surrender.

The campaign of 1862 in the West was about to open. Its result must be of momentous consequence to the Confederacy. If favorable it meant the retention of the beef and grain states of Tennessee and Mississippi and their splendid population, as also the control of that great artery of commerce and inter-communication between the states, the mighty Mississippi river. If the result of the campaign was unfavorable, it meant the loss of control of the Tennessee river as far as Florence, Alabama, with the immediate evacuation of the state of Tennessee. In the near future it meant the complete control of the Mississippi river with its means of transporting large bodies of troops. It so happens that most of the steamboats on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers were owned in St. Louis, Louisville, Cincinnati and Pittsburg. As soon as the clouds of war began to lower, these steamboats were gradually moved north of Cairo and when the lines were closed at Memphis, about April 1st, 1861, very few of these boats were caught below that point. This was a most serious disadvantage to the South, for with such means of transportation at hand, the Federal authorities could move a large army to any point on these streams and tributaries in a few days.

It may be well to take a retrospect of military affairs up to this



time. It has, for a long time, been the opinion of the writer that the victory of the Southern arms at Bull Run, whilst in one sense, a brilliant victory, it resulted, in another sense, as a disaster. Had the success been followed up by the capture of Washington and Baltimore, and a peace forced, at that time, the victory would have borne fruit. As it resulted, it created an over-weening confidence in the South of their strength, not justified by facts. This over confidence had at once a perceptible effect in a decrease of volunteers to the rank of the army in the field, for the first year after that victory.

It had a contrary effect on the people of the North. It convinced them of the size of the job they had undertaken and that the time for vigorous action had arrived.

To have successfully defended the long line in the West, heretofore described, it would have required an additional force of 50,000 men. Where were they to be had? Over confidence was a primitive cause for this deficit.

These thoughts have often occurred and are recorded with the frank admission that it is much easier to criticise past events than to foresee and provide remedies against future ills.

In the latter part of January Grant commenced developing his plan of campaign. A feint was first made by sending Crittenden's division up Green river to a point within about fifty miles of Bowling Green. To meet this advance a division of about 6,000 men, under General Buckner, was detached from Hardee's command. As Grant's real object was Fort Henry on the Tennessee river, Crittenden's command was soon re-embarked and Buckner's division was gradually moved around toward Fort Donelson, reaching that point in time to take an active part in opposing the attack of Grant, which eventually culminated in its surrender on the 16th of February.

It so happened that about the time it had developed that Grant was moving on Fort Henry it chanced some business with Colonel Mackall, General Johnston's Chief of Staff, caused the writer to drop into his office. It so happened that he had just learned that the defensive works on the opposite side of the river from Fort Henry had not been constructed.

Only three were present in the room. General Johnston was walking back and forth in the room in long strides, apparently very much excited. "It is most extraordinary—I ordered General Polk four months ago to at once construct those works and now with the enemy on us, nothing of importance has been done. It is most extraordinary, most extraordinary," repeating these words in the most emphatic language. I had met this grand man quite



often at Columbus and was much attached to him. I never saw him so much wrought up before.

The evacuation of Bowling Green on his orders, was at once quietly commenced and continued till its evacuation on the 13th of February. All the siege guns and all other material and stores were successfully removed by rail—except some quartermaster and commissary stores the removing of which was not attempted but were burned on the morning of the evacuation of the post on the 13th of February.

Fort Henry surrendered on February 6th, with about eighty artillery men—the infantry garrison of 2,600 men making a timely retreat to Donelson.

Fort Donelson surrendered with its large garrison, under General Buckner on the 16th of February.

The rear guard of Hardee's command, General Hindman's brigade, evacuated Bowling Green on the 13th of February after having destroyed the commissary stores that could not be removed, the advance brigade of Buell's army arriving on the heights on the opposite side of Barren river and throwing a few shells as a parting salute. Barren river at this point and for several miles each way passes through a deep gorge that is impassable except at the bridge at the crossing of the turnpike leading to Munfordsville. This bridge had been burned at daylight after crossing over, scouts to go north until the enemy was met and then report by the best route.

The surrender of Fort Donelson with the way open to the enemy's gunboats to Nashville rendered it compulsory that Hardee's command should be rushed forward by rail and otherwise, before the bridges over the Cumberland river could be destroyed, as they were the only means of crossing that stream, with Buell's much superior force, supposedly rapidly advancing in the rear.

The enemy did not realize their opportunity and nothing transpired of moment until this command had crossed into Nashville.

After a few days rest Hardee's Bowling Green command, now the rear guard of the army, marched leisurely to Murfreesboro, thence through Shelbyville, Huntsville, Decatur and Tusculumbia, reaching in the latter part of March, Corinth, Miss., the point selected by General Johnston, as the rendezvous of all of the troops of his department east of the Mississippi river.

It is not within the province of this sketch to give in detail the events of this eventful campaign, but only so much as will practically substantiate an opinion advanced in the forepart of this sketch.

"In all the battles of Hardee's corps, (with some few changes in its division) Shiloh, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Missionary Ridge,

all the engagements of the Atlanta campaign, ending in the fall in Atlanta, this corps never turned its back to the foe in battle."

The evacuation of Bowling Green, after moving to the rear all ordinance and ordinance stores and other impediments; thence acting as the rear guard to the army for at least 300 miles, though not a brilliant affair, to do it satisfactorily, requires energy, skill and military experience.

The troops concentrated at Corinth consisted of Polk's command from Columbus, Ky.; Hardee's command from Bowling Green, Ky.; General George Crittenden's command, from the Fishing Creek Line, General Bragg's command from Pensacola, Fla., and the odds and ends of small detachments from other points.

Before going into battle these troops had to be organized into brigades, divisions and corps, and as General Buell's army, from Nashville, was on the march to form a junction with General Grant's army (that had successfully reduced Fort Donelson and Fort Henry) at Pittsburg landing, on the Tennessee river, very little time was given for this necessary work. It was completed, however, as thoroughly as possible for raw troops about the first of April.

On the third of April the army was put in motion for a movement on Grant's army, with his advance, camped in the vicinity of Shiloh Church in front of Pittsburg landing.

The third corps under Hardee, and consisting of the commands brought from Kentucky, with a few additions was in the advance and with Gladden's brigade of Bragg's corps, was to form the front line of battle.

The second corps under Bragg, was to form the second line of battle, one thousand yards in rear of the first line.

The first corps under Major-General Polk, was to form the third line of battle, stationed six hundred yards in rear of the second line.

A division of three brigades under Brigadier-General Breckinridge was held as a reserve.

Hardee's corps reached the vicinity of the Mickie House on the evening of April the third, and early the next morning formed line of battle a short distance in front, Colonel Cleburne's brigade covering the road to Shiloh Church.

For sufficient cause the expected advance was not made on the fourth, as originally intended. In the forenoon the cavalry brought in eight or ten cavalry men in brand new uniforms, of the enemy. In the afternoon, whilst Hardee was on the battle line with Cleburne, some desultory firing was heard in the front. Soon a few cavalry men came in sight, then more and more firing, then apparently a regiment of cavalry came in view dashing madly



on in a complete panic. As they came nearer, Cleburne took in the situation, withdrew a company of the Fifth Tennessee, Colonel Hill, from the road to allow them to pass, through which they passed in a mad rush, the Colonel bringing up the rear, with the appearance of heart-felt mortification. Following close on the heels of the last Confederates, was a Federal sergeant, well mounted and a fine rider, who was so intent on the business in hand, that he charged up within fifty yards of the Infantry line, before taking in the situation. Instead of surrendering, as demanded, he pulled up his horse wheeled to his left and as he did so fired, with his revolver, into the infantry rank wounding a man. Just then a volley from the infantry belched forth, the man and the horse falling in a heap. That gallant fellow deserved a better fate. I think he belonged to the 11th Illinois Cavalry. Before night, Cleburne gave that man honorable burial, just where he lay.

A section of artillery fired several rounds. This cavalry regiment was, today, having its first experience in actual war and being inexperienced, in getting mixed up with the enemy's cavalry, took one of the unexplainable panics. With more experience it became one of the best regiments of the service.

These details are given to indicate, that ordinary vigilance on the part of General Sherman, who commanded the advance division of General Grant's army, should have caused him to send a reconnaissance in force to determine what was in his front, for this artillery fire could have been plainly audible and the cavalry saw the artillery and line of infantry.

Hardee's line, the third corps, made an early advance on the fifth of April, in such formation as would admit of a speedy order of battle line, the front being well covered with cavalry. When close to the enemy's pickets, the line of battle was formed, with all arrangements made for an attack.

It appears that General Beauregard was of opinion, that it was now too late for an attack; for the reason that General Buell, had had time to form a junction with Grant; and advised the Confederate army be withdrawn. General Johnston thereupon called a council of war, stated the situation and asked the advice of the corps and division commanders.

It was understood that the almost unanimous advice of the council was for immediate attack, Hardee among the majority. After a full discussion, it was determined by General Johnston, to begin the attack at about daylight on the sixth of April with strict orders that no fires should be lighted at night.

The battle order delivered that night was laconic. "The forces will move at 5:40 o'clock tomorrow morning." To insure simul-

taneous movement of the two wings, Hardee sent a staff officer to the commanding officer of each wing, with a watch to time. The writer delivering the order to General Gladden commanding the brigade on the right of the line of battle was asked "which way?" "Move forward," the answer. General Gladden fell mortally wounded the first day. He was a brave, gallant, well-trained officer.

The troops had enjoyed a good rest after their tramp from Corinth, were in splendid condition and in fine spirits for the attack.

The front line, with scarcely any resistance swept through the first camps. There was every evidence of a complete surprise. This was more in evidence to the writer who was ordered soon after the first camp were swept over, to search for the enemy's reserve ammunition, as the third corps went into the fight with only sixty rounds of ammunition per musket. This necessitated a thorough search which indicated every evidence of a surprise. An abundance of ammunition was found and the command in front notified of its locality.

There was so much timber in all parts of the field, that a staff officer after carrying orders had great difficulty in finding his chief, who was also constantly changing his position. That occurred with me and after a vain attempt to find my chief and meeting up with General Bragg, my dilemma was stated and he made use of me for some time in carrying orders, as he himself was deficient as to his own staff.

It will be recalled that the battle field of Shiloh was an open, post oak woods, with an occasional cultivated field, the woods largely predominating. Sometimes those open woods were filled in by dense oak brush. The onslaught of the first line of battle in the center was not checked till about noon when there was encountered in one of these areas of brush, what was afterwards called "the hornets nest." A country road passing through one of these oak thickets had become so worn and washed out by rains, that by lying flat a man was pretty well protected. As the Federal lines retired, this road bed suiting the direction of their line, was quickly occupied. The front, being covered by this oak thicket, our men in advancing were allowed to approach within short range, when a deadly volley was delivered, always resulting in bloody repulse.

About this time, the three lines in the rear of the third corps in their eagerness to join in the fight had moved so swiftly forward that the check given the first line, caused them all to close in rear of each other. The right of Cheatham was just in rear of the "Hornet's Nest"—Breckinridge was on his right. I carried orders to each of these officers. The Federals in the "Hornet's



Nest" repulsed repeated attacks of our men and were only dislodged finally by a flank and rear attack.

After this position was passed over there was not much fighting, until the enemy's camp on the bluffs, overlooking the Tennessee river, was reached when by a concentrated charge in front and flanks, Prentiss division was surrounded and captured some 2,000 prisoners with the commanding officer. This charge brought together portions of the divisions of each of the three corps.

There were soon assembled on this open Generals Bragg, Hardee, Polk and Breckinridge. In front, at the foot of the bluffs, flowed the Tennessee river, hidden from the view by trees and underwood.

The only sign of resistance was the fire of a Federal battery about five hundred yards to the left, located on the bluff just above Pittsburg landing. It was firing grape shot apparently, but doing no damage. No time was lost in congratulations at our success, but the different commands were being quickly re-organized, getting ready for a final onslaught. It is distinctly recollected there were three lines formed facing that battery. These several lines occupied depressions at the head of gulches leading to the river, but which were hidden from the view of the gunboats and afforded good protection from the fire of Webster's Federal battery. It was three-quarters of an hour to an hour before sundown and there appeared ample time to finish the job. The men were in high feather and ready for the onslaught. The gunboats were not firing—probably not knowing yet the position of affairs.

Suddenly to the disappointment of everybody, an order came from the General in Command, Beauregard (as General Johnston had fallen about noon) for the army to withdraw from under the fire of the gunboats and bivouac for the night. That order had a demoralizing effect on the army. It was then there was needed the iron will of General Albert Sydney Johnston.

As afterwards ascertained, the front division of Buell's army had not arrived and the disordered remnants of Grant's army were massed in the river bottom at Pittsburg landing without much organization and by a vigorous attack of the Confederates would have quickly surrendered as the gunboats on the river could have afforded no assistance without firing into their own men.

The army retired about a mile and bivouacked among the enemies camp.

During the night the bulk of Buell's army about 30,000 men strong, came to the relief of Grant's beaten army and at daylight commenced expanding its lines and soon came in contact with the Confederate reformed lines. These fresh, well organized troops were more than a match for their opponents; tired and leg weary

after an all day's fight the day before and still worse, despondent at being deprived of the fruits of their valor.

After ineffectual attempts to break through the Federal line, the General-in-Chief, determined to withdraw his army and retire back to Corinth.

This withdrawal was successfully accomplished about noon of the seventh of April. The enemy were satisfied to be left alone, did not pursue and without any mishap of consequence, the bulk of the army, on the afternoon and night of the eighth of April were distributed in camps in and around Corinth.

These few details of the Shiloh battle are given from memory, and are what the writer saw or was well cognizant of. Nothing could be seen on that day except immediately around one, on account of the timber and occasionally brush. The writer's testimony bears on two mooted questions: One as to whether Sherman was or should have been surprised; the other as to the condition of affairs after the surrender of Prentiss' Division and the final arrangement for the last charge, at the time the order was given for the withdrawal of the troops. My recollection of those events are very vivid, almost as much so as had they occurred on yesterday.

The Confederate army lay at Corinth nearly two months. It was re-inforced by the command of General Van Dorn and General Price from the Trans-Mississippi Department. When the several commands had been consolidated they occupied a fortified line covering all the approaches to Corinth. Van Dorn occupying the extreme right, immediated on the right of Hardee's corps.

In the meantime the Federal authorities were not idle, but were gradually accumulating re-inforcements to the Grant-Buell army, until its effective strength approximately one hundred thousand men, with General Halleck, as General-in-Chief. This large army was cautiously advanced and soon came in contact with the fortified line of their opponent. In establishing their entrenched line of circumvallation, whilst there was no general engagements, there were sharp and determined fighting between brigades or smaller detachments in which the Confederates always held their own.

The Confederates were, however, soon brought face to face with a new and insidious enemy, sickness. The water about Corinth, mostly from wells, proved very unwholesome and soon caused an epidemic of that worst of all camp diseases, dysentery, which soon decimated the fighting strength of the army.

In the latter part of May, General Beauregard planned an attack on the left flank and rear of the Federal Army.

Hardee's corps and Van Dorn's corps by a night march moved around and obtained an advantageous position on the enemy's flank, by 10 o'clock in the forenoon, and were ready for the



onslaught, men and officers in fine spirits. Suddenly and for no apparent good reason the attack was called off, and the troops ordered back to their old intrenchments. It was thought at the time this was unfortunate for it decreased the confidence of the army, in the capacity of their chief.

In the meantime sickness among the troops did not decrease, but rather the contrary, as warm weather approached. From this cause and from more definite knowledge of the much superior force of the enemy, it was determined to withdraw the army from Corinth to some healthier locality in the rear. Tupelo, Mississippi, miles from Corinth, having been selected, a salubrious location on the Mobile and Ohio railroad.

This withdrawal was commenced on the night of May 30th, and was successfully accomplished. All stores, all the sick and wounded were successfully conveyed to the rear.

The enemy did not attempt to follow and harass, and in a week or ten days the several corps were settled down in their new encampments, around Tupelo, where the water was wholesome and the environments dry and healthy. The troops soon began to feel the benefit of the new location in improved health.

The failure to secure the benefit of the first day's victory at Shiloh Church, the withdrawal of the army back to Corinth, the depressing effect of sickness and finally the retiring of the forces still further South, without a fight, to Tupelo; all these causes had a very depressing effect and resulted in much demoralization among the rank and file of the army.

Besides it was composed, by massing together all the commands and detached fragments, from the Western Department on the eve of a great battle and sufficient time had not been allowed to assort and cement this heterogeneous mass into brigades and divisions. It was absolutely necessary that this should be done before any further military operations.

Fortunately at this time General Braxton Bragg succeeded, by seniority, to the command of the army, caused by the retirement of General Beauregard on account of continued bad health.

As proven by subsequent events, General Bragg developed "as the right man in the right place." A strict disciplinarian, thoroughly skilled in organization, there was no officer of the Confederate Army more competent "to lick into shape" raw, half-demoralized troops and to force them down into something like discipline. In all this work he was ably assisted by General Hardee (scarcely second to him in those military virtues) and by the other corps and division commanders.

Their labors were soon rewarded by the improved morale of the

men, their improvement in drill and soldierly bearing and more important still in their marked improvement in discipline.

The fall of Corinth resulted in the Federal control of the Mississippi river, as far as Memphis (practically as far as Vicksburg); the occupation of the state of Tennessee west of the Cumberland range and of the Tennessee river valley of northern Alabama.

After resting about Tupelo, Miss., about two months, with complete restoration to health and a marked improvement in discipline and general efficiency, two corps of this army were transferred to Chattanooga, Tennessee together with all its artillery and wagontrains, prepared to take the offensive.

One of these corps (Cheatham's and Wither's divisions) was under the command of Major-General Polk; the other, under command of Major-General Hardee, General S. B. Buckner and General Patton Anderson being Division Commanders.

This movement to Chattanooga fore-shadowed the celebrated Kentucky campaign. Bragg making a direct march to central Kentucky moving on to Buell's rear and directly on his line of communications.

In conjunction with this movement General Kirby Smith with a column of 5,000 men, moved to the south of the fortified position of Cumberland Gap directly for Richmond and Lexington, the center of the Blue Grass region of Kentucky. The movement was brilliantly conceived and brilliantly executed and resulted in the evacuation of North Alabama, the entire state of Tennessee west of the Cumberland range except Nashville and a few posts on the Mississippi river; gaining, for the time being, possession of all of central Kentucky with its rich stores of commissary and quartermaster supplies.

The campaign resulted in two battles, one at Richmond and the other at Perryville, both complete victories for the Southern arms.

General Bragg crossed the Tennessee river at Chattanooga on the 28th of August with two corps, representing an effective total of 29,000 men, moved rapidly through Sparta and Glasgow, Ky., getting on to Buell's line of supply at Cave City, thence to Munsfordville, Ky., where he surrounded and after some fighting forced the surrender of the sixteenth of September of the garrison of over four thousand prisoners with their arms and stores. Buell, in the meantime, had concentrated his army and was moving rapidly to overtake him, with a much superior army, so close that at Munsfordville Bragg's rear guard, skirmishing with his advance.

General Bragg continued on the direct road to Louisville, to the vicinity of Hodgenville and there turned eastwardly to Bards-



town. Buell as he came up continuing on his route to Louisville declining to force Bragg to battle.

General Bragg rested his command at Bardstown about a week. General Buell having received reinforcements and supplied his command with sufficient supplies for a campaign, moved on the army at Bardstown, left under the command of General Polk. (Bragg having gone ahead to Lexington for a conference with General Kirby Smith.) Polk moved the two corps in the direction of Harrodsburg and had reached the village of Perryville, within ten miles of that point when General Bragg returned to the vicinity of the army. It is deemed unnecessary for the purpose of this sketch to detail various feints and maneuvers of Buell and the controverting maneuvers of Bragg to meet them. Suffice it that Bragg determined to force a battle in the vicinity of Perryville and ordered General Withers' division to rejoin his corps at Perryville in time for the expected battle fixed for the 8th of October. From some cause Withers' division did not reach the field in time and the battle was joined on the eighth of October, with only three of the four divisions of the army.

The line of battle was selected for an offensive movement diagonally across a valley with Anderson's division of Hardee's corps on the left and Cheatham's corps of Polk's corps on the right of Buckner's division.

From one cause or another the advance was not made until about 11 o'clock a. m., on the 8th of October. The troops were in splendid trim for the fight. The two divisions of Hardee's corps, Patton, Anderson's and Buckner's and Cheatham's division behaved with splendid gallantry and moved steadily forward without being effectually checked until sundown, when the field had been swept clean of the enemy, capturing about six hundred prisoners. The three divisions that day contained an effective total of a little less than 15,000 infantry and artillery. The enemy's forces as afterward ascertained was about fifty per cent more.

Bragg's forces occupied the field until 12 o'clock at night, when on account of lack of supplies and the known strength of the enemy, they were withdrawn and the next day retired to Harrodsburg. Buell was again offered battle but declined to attack Bragg's now united army.

The want of proper depots of supplies, the approach of the rainy season and the well-developed strength of Buell's army, determined General Bragg to retire from Kentucky via the Cumberland Gap, which had been evacuated by the Federal garrison about the 1st of October. The movement commenced from Harrodsburg on the 11th of October via Bryantsville, Crab Orchard, London, Barbourville and Cumberland Gap, to Knoxville. On or about Decem-

ber 1st. Polk's corps had been transferred to Murfreesboro and Hardee's corps to Shelbyville, the latter soon moving up to Eagleville, a point opposite Polk's position.

As General Bragg truthfully states in his report of this campaign, "In four weeks after passing Cumberland Gap in this memorable and arduous campaign, jaded, hungry and ragged (as necessarily incident to such service) this noble army was found in serried rank in front of the enemy at Nashville, better organized, better disciplined, better clothed and fed, in better health and tone and in larger numbers, than when it entered on the campaign."

The details of the concentration of the army of Tennessee, by the transfer of Hardee's corp from Eagleville to Murfreesboro on December 28th, 1862, has been given in a sketch (published in the Confederate Veteran) of the events leading up to that battle and will not be repeated. Brigadier Cleburne promoted to Major-General was given command of Buckner's division, that officer having been given a higher command. General J. C. Breckinridge returned from the movement on Port Hudson was given command of the other division of which Hanson's Kentucky Brigade formed a part.

These two divisions, at first, formed the right of the army, with the left resting on Stone's river, Breckinridge in front, Cleburne in rear as a support. Polk's corps formed the left wing with the right of Wither's division, forming the front line resting on Stone's river, supported by Cheatham's division in rear. This was the formation on the morning of December 30th. During that day, however, Rosencranz commenced extending his right wing, under McCook so as to overlap Polk's left, so far that McCown's division held in reserve was advanced to General Wither's left. Cleburne's division was then withdrawn, hastily, from the extreme right of the army and placed in position to support McCown.

Lieutenant General Hardee was given command of the left wing of the army.

Rosencranz had thus accomplished his purpose of weakening the Confederate right so that he would be enabeled to cross a large force the next morning over Stone's river and throw it on the Confederate right, hoping to find, then, a clear way to Murfreesboro. He reckoned without his host, however. Bragg's plan of battle appears to have been quickly formed; which was by a vigorous attack at daylight on the Federal right by Hardee's corps, to double it back on his center, the entire army left of Stone's river to join in with a swing to the right with Polk's right as the pivot.

At daylight of a foggy drizzly morning McCown's division with



Cleburne in close support made a vigorous onslaught on the enemy, who were so much surprised that a battery of artillery was captured before the horses were hitched and the brigade commander, General Willich with many of his men taken prisoners. This successful onslaught was vigorously followed up and line after line of the enemy were routed and disposed. In making the swing to the right McCown's division, in following the enemy, had gradually moved off to the left leaving an interval between his division and Withers's. Cleburne taking in the situation promptly filled the interval with his division and thereafter the corps fought with a single line of battle.

In the meantime the two divisions of Polk's corps, Withers and Cheatham, immediately on Hardee's right, promptly advanced on the enemy in front and were equally as successful after desperate fighting, in routing the enemy at every stand they made. This successful fighting in front of Hardee's and Polk's corps was kept up until about three p. m., when the enemy's right had been doubled back on its center so far as to be very near the Nashville turnpike. Hardee's two divisions at that time occupied a position, facing the enemy, at an angle of about one hundred degrees from the original position, at the beginning of the engagement, caused by making the swing to the right.

The several brigades of Hardee's Corps had become a good deal detached from each other in pursuing the enemy in their front, on account of the swinging nature of the movement and it became absolutely necessary to reform and consolidate the divisions before risking a further advance, for it was in evidence that the enemy had heavily reinforced their left for a vigorous defense of their line of communication.

This required time and as the men had been fighting since daylight without much food and less water, it was determined by General Hardee to rest and await further orders from General Bragg. In the meantime the prisoners of war at the Federal field hospital on the Wilkerson pike had been paroled to the number of about 600 men. The troops bivouacked as they lay for the night.

This conflict was about the most successful all day's fight of Hardee's command during the war. The enemy was driven back at least three miles as measured on the map, made from actual survey afterwards. As the portion of the corps fronting the enemy at the end of the battle was at an angle of 100 degrees of the full circle from the original position of the morning, the troops must have travelled at least three and a half miles.

The enemy appeared thoroughly demoralized by the fierce onslaught and continued success of their opponents. Had there been even a fresh brigade turned loose on their disorganized masses

followed up by the detached brigades of Hardee's corps, assisted by a vigorous forward movement of the troops to the right, the victory would have been complete and most of their artillery would have been captured. As it turned out no reinforcements were available.

General Hardee, as in all the battles his corps were engaged, was well to the front and gave personal attention to all the important details of the day's operation.

The expectation at army headquarters was that after the complete route of his right wing and right center General Rosencranz would withdraw his army back to Nashville either that night or the next day. The hope was not realized, however, and on the morning of January 2nd he was still "standing pat."

The extreme left of the Federal Army was located on a prominent position on the east side of Stone's River at a point near which that stream was fordable. Evidently Rosencranz must have by this time strongly fortified his right flank that had been doubled back on the first day's fight and had to be held to protect his communications. His center and left flank west of Stone's River was also strongly fortified, so that in order to force the enemy to vacate their lines it was necessary to seize this position on the east side of Stone's River just before night, hold it and during the night to construct earth works for an infantry support and positions for a sufficient park of artillery. As batteries in this position could enfilade the entire left flank of the enemy and make it untenable, it was believed the retirement of the enemy would result.

General Breckinridge made a careful reconnaissance of the position in the forenoon of January 2nd. General Bragg determined to have the position carried by assault that evening and during the night strongly fortify it. Breckinridge's division of four brigades with an effective total of 5,100 men was assigned to the task.

The assault on this position was made promptly at 4 o'clock on January 2nd, the position carried against a superior force and the enemy driven to the river bank below. At this stage a Federal battery of fifty-eight pieces of artillery that had been massed as well as masked at a point on the opposite side of the river that forenoon and that were completely hidden from view from the reconnaissance made in the forenoon by Breckinridge, were turned loose at a 300 or 400 yard range on that gallant division. Of course their could be but one result, their utter route and retreat to the rear to the woods in which the division had been formed previous to the assault. Of a force of 5,100 men taken into the battle, its loss in killed, wounded and missing was 1,700 men, including General Hanson and other valuable officers.

The result of this day's battle, together with information ob-



tained from the cavalry that the enemy were receiving considerable reinforcements determined General Bragg to withdraw his army from his position in front of the enemy and retire to the rear. General Rosencranz appeared to be very willing to be left alone as he did not follow his adversary.

The campaign of 1862 ended by General Rosencranz placing his army into winter quarters around Murfreesboro and General Bragg followed his example by encamping his troops in winter quarters around Shelbyville and Tullahoma, within thirty and forty miles respectively of his adversary's headquarters.

The campaign of 1863 opened with the army of Tennessee under Bragg occupying Shelbyville with Polk's corps and Hardee's corps of Cleyburne's division and Breckinridge's division, located at Wartrace, opposite on the N. & C. Railroad. These positions could be turned by a flank movement of Rosencranz by the Murfreesboro and Manchester turnpike on Hardee's right.

When Rosencranz was ready for the advance in June from his position at Murfreesboro, he by a vigorous attack, obtained possession of and held Hover's Gap, an important position on that turnpike, and proceeded to move in force through that pass.

This movement on Bragg's right compelled him to retire his two corps to Tullahoma, where he offered battle. His adversary declined and preferred continuing the flank movement on his right. The Cumberland Mountain, being close in the rear, General Bragg determined to pass over those mountains at Sewanee and evacuate all of Tennessee westward, crossing the Tennessee River about July fourth and thence on to Chattanooga's vicinity about July seventh. Thus three important events occurred on this date: the battle of Gettysburg, which though glorious to the Southern arms, necessitated the evacuation of Maryland by Lee's Army; the surrender of Vicksburg with its garrison of about 20,000 prisoners with the loss of control of that mighty river, with all of its incalculable consequences and last the loss of the grain growing, meat producing State of Tennessee with its loyal people. These three events, occurring almost simultaneously, were in the nature of a calamity to the cause of the South.

The surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg and their consequent dispersion to their homes, rendered it absolutely necessary that measures should be taken to collect them in some central camp, reorganize them and have them ready for the field as soon as they could be exchanged. For this important work President Davis selected Lieutenant General Hardee, and Enterprise, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, below Meridian, was chosen as the point of rendezvous. Hardee at once proceeded to that point taking with him most of his staff and entered on his new work.

It was considered by the writer at the time as much to be regretted that this veteran corps commander should have been taken from the command of his old corps almost on the eve of a battle on the result of which so much depended.

General Hardee successfully performed the object of his mission to Mississippi and was then reassigned for service with the Army of Tennessee. In the meantime matters had settled down following the great battle of Chickamauga and movements were being made for the final possession of the strategic point of Chattanooga.

Grant had succeeded to the command of the Federal Army and was being reinforced by Hooker's corps from the Army of the Potomac and by Sherman's corps of about 20,000 men marching from Memphis. Longstreet's corps from the Army of Northern Virginia had been returned to that army through Knoxville, taking with him two of the best brigades from Bragg's army.

It is conceded unnecessary for the object of this sketch to give in detail the movements of the two armies leading up to the battle of Missionary Ridge. Lookout Mountain had been evacuated after a gallant fight of Walthal's brigade against the overwhelming force of Hooker's corps. Sherman had laid a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chickamauga creek, preparatory to an attack on the Confederate right, holding the end of Missionary Ridge, bordering on that creek.

Bragg's army occupied the crest of the ridge from the Chickamauga Creek on the right for some miles to the left.

General Hardee commanded the right wing of the army, Cleburne's division on the extreme right, Cheatham's division on the left, with Walker's division in the center. The left (as per General Bragg's report), was commanded by General Breckinridge, the constituents of whose command is not recalled. Grant's plan, as he afterwards gave out, was for Hooker's corps to move from the vicinity of Lookout Mountain and attack Bragg's left. Simultaneously Sherman's corps, now massed on the south side of the Tennessee River, was to attack Bragg's right, held by Cleburne's division on the end of Missionary Ridge, the movement on Bragg's center having been intended as a feint, as that portion of the line appeared naturally so strong as to make success improbable.

About noon Grant commenced marshalling his forces opposite the center and left of Bragg. The commanding position of Bragg's army gave a fine view of the plains below (almost devoid of timber), on which he was deploying his columns for the attack. His forces were formed in two lines of battle just outside of artillery range and extended apparently for a mile each way. It was a magnificent sight long to be remembered and was in full view of Bragg's depleted line of battle.



About 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon this magnificent array advanced to the attack preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers. The artillery of Bragg was used with fine effect as soon as they came within range. Sherman's attack on the right was stubbornly met by Cleburne. Again and again the attack was renewed, but always met a bloody repulse. At one time the enemy made a lodgement close up under Cleburne's line, so close as to be under cover from his fire. It was then that a sortee was made by a part of his command who charged down the hill and killed and captured all of the enemy who could not get away. In this attack Cleburne was reinforced by Maney's and Brown's of Cheatham's division and Cummin's brigade of Walker's division.

About this time General Hardee, who had been in Cleburne's vicinity during the fighting, was attracted by heavy firing on the left of his corps. On rapidly moving to that point it was ascertained that the entire center division of the army up to the left of Cheatham's division, soon followed by the entire left wing, had given way and were making to the rear, pell-mell. On reaching the top of the ridge the enemy had changed front and were moving down on Cheatham's flank. Taking in the situation at a glance Cheatham caused Walthal's brigade to form across the ridge, who received the enemy with such a withering fire and determined front as to check their further advance. The gallant Walthal received a painful wound in the foot. In the midst of this fight Hardee came up and warmly congratulated both Cheatham and Walthal for their splendid work which probably saved the army from an utter route. Night approaching the enemy made no further movement on Cheatham's flank.

The writer desires to make this statement in behalf of the division in the center, that took such a panic, as soon as the enemy reached the foot of the hill. Ere the enemy could have made the necessarily slow climb to the top of the ridge, they could have been almost annihilated, had the now single line of Confederate infantry with the adequate artillery force on the flank stood firm and fired leisurely. To my knowledge, as the enemy was preparing to attack, the force on top did not form more than a single line of men, because of reinforcements being sent to their left and the line necessarily drawn and attenuated to that extent.

As was fully stated by General Bragg, Hardee's corps saved the army from utter route, as there were only two bridges across Chicamauga River there would have been many prisoners. General Hardee after nightfall slowly withdrew his corps from left to right, across a bridge in the rear of Cleburne's position, the rear of the latter division crossing about 9 o'clock at night. The writer, under orders to look to the withdrawal of this division, met General Cle-

burne on that moonlight night on the levee leading to the bridge. Knowing the utter route of the other wing, gloom and despondency enshrouded the situation. It was the first time the writer ever heard him give way to despondency as to the result of the cause he held so dear. To each occurred the familiar words about "the silver lining to every cloud."

The army halted long enough at Chickamauga Station to replenish their supplies and retreated slowly towards Ringold and Dalton. Hardee's corps, with Cleburne's division in the rear, brought up the rear. Of course the army officers and men were very gloomy and demoralized, but there was not as much straggling as was to have been expected. The bulk of the army passed Ringold on the evening of the 26th of November, Cleburne camping a little in the rear of that point. There it was learned that the enemy were following with a strong and over-confident force. Cleburne was directed to take a portion in Ringold gap just in the rear of the town and defend it at all hazards in order to give time for the artillery and baggage wagons to get out of the way. By the time the enemy made their appearance in superior force, Cleburne had made his dispositions for the fight. It is only necessary to state that Cleburne delivered battle in his usual vigorous style and that after an engagement that lasted five or six hours the enemy were repulsed with such a heavy loss that they did not renew the attack and the wagon trains and artillery passed on to Dalton in safety.

For this brilliant action Cleburne and his command received the unusual recognition and compliment of the thanks of the Confederate Congress and moreover the heartfelt thanks of the Confederate people.

Without any unusual happenings the army reached Dalton on November 28 and were, as fast as possible, settled down into winter quarters. They certainly needed time for rest and recuperation after having recently passed through two bloody battles and the usual hardships of a campaign that lasted from June 1st to the latter date.

Up to this date there had not been an unfavorable criticism or any fault found by his superior officers with the skill and ability exercised by Lieutenant General Hardee in the handling of his several commands during the memorable campaigns of 1862 and 1863. On the contrary universal commendation. He was always guided by loyalty to the South and to his superior officers. He had always possessed the friendship, good will and loyalty of the various division commanders who served under him Cleburne, Hindman, Buckner, Anderson, Cheatham, Bate, Walker and Preston. It is believed he possessed the confidence of his command down to the soldier in the ranks.



General Bragg in his report of the battle of Missionary Ridge and the retirement to Dalton says: "Lieutenant General Hardee, as usual, is entitled to my warmest thanks and highest commendation for his gallant and judicious conduct during the whole of the trying scenes which we passed."

General Bragg at his request was relieved of the command of the army about December 1st and the command turned over to Lieutenant General Hardee until the arrival of General Joseph E. Johnston to whom was assigned the permanent command of the Army of Tennessee.

At this date General Bragg retired from active command and did not afterwards desire or seek any further command in the field. It is believed by the writer that this officer has not received up to this time the credit due him for his military services in that struggle from the succeeding generations of the Southern people. The strictest disciplinarian in every sense, he yet possessed the warmest feeling for the volunteer soldier in the ranks and was inclined to some extent to condone for his breach of discipline. But he was at the same time unrelenting in following up and punishing an officer for setting an example to the man in the ranks by breach of discipline or any unsoldierly act. On assuming command at Tupelo in 1862, the soldiers considered him a tyrant for some of his summary acts for breaches of discipline. After the same soldiers had passed through battle and seen the necessity of discipline, the blindly obeying of orders, the same soldiers applauded acts they had before condemned. They learned that the safety of the cause and of the army depended upon every officer and soldier doing his duty.

His battles were well planned and to a certain extent victorious (as Murfreesboro and Chickamauga), but from various causes the fruits of these victories were not gathered. Had one or both these battles been a finished success General Bragg possessed such personal traits of character as would have made him the idol of his army.

The campaign of 1864 in the west opened with General J. E. Johnston at Dalton with an army of something less than 40,000 men, infantry and artillery (effective total). General W. T. Sherman confronted him with an army of 98,000 men of all arms located around Chattanooga or within close call of that point. General Sherman reports his army was kept up to this strength by reinforcements during the coming campaign.

The results of the campaign of 1863 was calculated to have a very depressing and despondent effect on the rank and file of the army and such was the case. Where trees were convenient the several divisions built rough log cabins for shelter and soon made

themselves more comfortable. It is recalled that early in the winter there commenced a religious revival that passed through most of the divisions.

The assignment of General Joseph E. Johnston had a manifesting effect in restoring confidence and the morale of the troops. Underlying all was the devotion to the justice of the cause we were all engaged in. General Hardee, for several months in command, was alive to the good policy of amusing and occupying the minds of the troops by a system of drills, parades and reviews. It is recalled a general review of the entire army was made, Cheatham being in command of his corps. All these combination of events had a fine effect in almost completely restoring its old esprit du corps and morale.

The following statement of conditions shows that there was need at once for all this patriotism and restored confidence. It will be recalled that the first year's enlistment of the entire Confederate army expired in the spring of 1862. The entire western army at Corinth re-enlisted for two more years. That period was about to expire at Dalton in the spring of 1864.

There was much anxiety at Richmond as well as among the higher officers of the Army of Tennessee as to the next happenings. Although they would be held by the Conscript law, passed nearly two years before, yet it was felt that if the men in the ranks were held against their will it would be in the nature of a disaster.

Suddenly the superb patriotism of the men in the ranks of the army presented a solution of the difficulty. To the glory and honor of the Tennessee troops this movement commenced in Co. A Sixth and Ninth Tennessee, Col. George C. Porter. It spread to the regiment until that entire brigade, Maney's, met in mass meeting, passed patriotic resolution, and re-enlisted for the war. On being published, it took like "wild fire," first through the several brigades of Cheatham's division and consecutively through every brigade of the army, even extending to every command of the Confederate army. (For particulars see Appendix B.)

Well might Senator Hill of Georgia exclaim on the floor of the Confederate Senate "All honor to the Tennesseans."

This movement that only required a "starter," relieved the load of anxiety existing in high quarters at Richmond as well as among all the higher officers of the army and produced that high confidence among the rank and file so necessary at the beginning of a campaign so fraught with good or ill to the Southern cause.

The campaign of 1864 in the west opened with General J. E. Johnston at Dalton with an army of something less than an effective total of 40,000 infantry and artillery. General W. T. Sherman



confronted him with an army of 98,000 men of all arms, located around Chatanooga or within easy call of that point. He reports his army was kept up to that strength by reinforcements during the coming campaign.

The confidence and good will of the army in their General-in-Chief increased as the months passed. His force being less than one half of that of his adversary, his plan of campaign strictly adhered to, was to force his adversary to attack him when covered by field works. He saved his men as much as possible by the avoidance of foolish and unnecessary charging breastworks.

The commissary and quartermaster department were well organized. The ration of one half pound of smoked bacon with one and a quarter pounds of corn meal (with equivalent in other cereals, ~~some-times corn~~), was distributed with regularity. No sugar, no coffee, no nothing else! This ration was scant, but it was supplemented by the patriotic action of the people of Georgia who freely offered all their green apples, vegetables and fields of sorghum. The writer saw many fields of sorghum disappear, the remnants being scattered along the line of march in the shape of the chewed up pith.

The camp equipage was equally as scant. One wagon for each regiment for cooking utensils and entrenching tools, tent-flies for all officers. Notwithstanding the above scant commissary and quartermaster stores this army was never in better health physically, more vigorous and in better trim for fight, not excepting during the Kentucky campaign. Their faith in having all their wants looked after and supplied and their knowledge that they would not be unnecessarily and foolishly exposed in battle, caused the rank and file of the army to have full confidence in their chief and to nerve them to do their full duty whenever he turned them loose on the enemy. The same spirit of confidence pervaded the entire army from corps commanders down to the man with the musket. The corps division and brigade commanders were never more in harmony and loyal to their chief. This unity told in battle for in every instance in which these forces clashed Sherman's forces were usually worsted.

The tactics of General Sherman were necessarily the opposite of Johnston's. He was placed there to advance into his enemy's country and was given an army commensurate with the job, two to one in strength. After finding out from sad experiences the impolicy of attacking his enemy in fortified works, he settled down to the slower plan of pushing his lines by superior force, close up to his adversaries works (causing at times severe engagements), and fortifying strongly. When sufficiently fortified, with a large force he moved on one of his adversary's flanks and caused him to vacate his works. In the mean time Johnston anticipating such tactics

had selected the next naturally strong position in the rear, marked it out for each division, would then vacate the late position about 9 o'clock at night and by the time his adversary appeared in front had sufficiently entrenched himself to receive him.

After crossing the Etowah River the Federal commander followed these general tactics, charging one time to his cost in the assault on the left of the Kennesaw line, hereafter to be noticed.

This general sketch of the tactics of the Generals-in-Chief of these two armies are given to render unnecessary the details of their several movements from Dalton to the crossing of the Chattahoochee.

Sherman's advance commenced about May 1st, his first movement being to pass his army through Snake Creek Gap in the high range of hills behind which Johnston's army was encamped at Dalton. This movement threatening Johnston's rear at Resaca, at the crossing of the Estinaula River, caused him to retire to that point and confront his adversary behind fortified works, already constructed. Sherman made several determined efforts to carry the most salient of these works, but was always vigorously repulsed with proportionate loss.

This forced Sherman to use his much superior force by a flank move, crossing the Estinaula below Resaca, threatening his opponent's rear and causing the evacuation of that point and the retiring towards Kingston and later to the open country in the vicinity of Cassville. At this point Johnston took up a strong position, determined to deliver battle to his adversary when he developed in front, going so far as to issue a battle order. Governor J. D. Porter then of Cheatham's staff writes in volume eight of Confederate History: "Hardee reported his troops were wild with enthusiasm and delight." The position was well chosen and the best occupied during the campaign, but according to General Johnston's report, Polk and Hood were unwilling to risk a battle there claiming that a part of Polk's line was enfiladed by the enemy's artillery and urged Johnston to abandon the place and cross the Etowah River. Hardee, though not so favorably posted, remonstrated against the change. General Johnston yielded his better judgment and lost his best opportunity and at daylight on May 20th reluctantly crossed the Etowah."

Johnston slowly fell back before his superior adversary, occasionally fortifying and receiving attack. The first important position fortified was what was known as the New Hope Church line, where in a preliminary fight, Cleburne's division administered a bloody repulse to a superior force of the enemy. Sherman finally by superior numbers closed up and fortified a line immediately in front of the New Hope position. Finally, despairing of piercing



his adversary's position in front, he made a movement in such force on Johnston's right flank that caused him to evacuate his strong position and fall back to a line in which Pine Mountain was a prominent point. On this mountain General Polk was killed by a stray shell on the 14th of June. Sherman continuing his flank movement caused Johnston to fall back to a line several miles in front of Kennesaw Mountain and finally in the latter part of June, after some sharp fighting, to what was called the "Kennesaw line," with that mountain forming Johnston's right.

After each of these changes of position there was more or less fighting between detachments in which the Confederates either held their own or administered severe punishment to their adversaries. At this time, June 24th, General Sherman (see his report), determined to assault Johnston's left and left centre fortified lines in order to convince his army that his heretofore system of tactics by superior force flanking his adversary to the rear, was not always to be followed. Accordingly this assault was made on the 27th of June. Johnston's lines extended from the right of Kennesaw Mountain the length of two corps' fronts to the left on very advantageous ground and by this time was well protected by field work. Hardee's corps occupied the extreme left, Cheatham's division on the left, then Cleburne's, then Bates', then Walker's. The line on the extreme left had an angle to the left of about 75 degrees with the main line. Cheatham's division wrapped around this angle (afterwards called the "Dead Angle") about one half brigade length.

As soon as Sherman's army came in touch with his adversary, he vigorously pushed his lines close up to his line and strongly fortified it, evidently having in view the assault determined upon. At the predetermined time Sherman delivered the assault (after making a demonstration on the entire line) the full force of the blow being dealt on Cheatham's entire front and on Cleburne's left. Although the assaulting columns were much superior in numbers they were vigorously repulsed at all points. The attack on the "Dead Angle" was several times repeated and was so determined and furious that it was said a color bearer planted his colors on the breastworks. A number of their dead lay within 100 feet of the line in an open space. It was necessary to bury these gallant fellows under a flag of truce a few days subsequent.

In front of Lowry's brigade of Cleburne the enemy charged through open woods to within fifty yards of his works leaving many dead and wounded as they fell. Just then last year's dead grass and brush caught fire from the enemy's musketry fire and was rapidly spreading among the dead and wounded. As soon as discovered, a white flag was displayed by Lowry's men, unarmed men from

each side gathered spontaneously and quickly and tenderly moved the dead and wounded to the Federal lines. Then the firing was resumed. Such incidents are among the few bright spots on war's rugged front, yet it was capable of being repeated by any brigade of the Grand Army of Tennessee.

General Sherman, as was doubtless his army, was satisfied of the utility of his new policy of direct assault on his adversaries fortified lines and resorted to his old tactics of threatening his enemy's rear by superior numbers and thus "shewing" him to the rear.

Johnston, by thus threatening his rear with no opportunity to strike back, was thus forced to evacuate his strongly fortified Kenesaw line and fall back to a previously selected line at "Symrna Church" a few miles south of Marietta. After some sharp fighting on that line he retired to a line previously fortified by the labor from the Georgia plantations which was an enlarged "Tete du pont" with each flank resting on the Chattahoochee river and extensive enough for the entire army. It was a very strong line well adopted for the army to retire across the stream if pushed but as it did not cover a good crossing of that stream a few miles above, Sherman did not pay much attention to it and did not close his lines around it as was usual with him. After a thorough reconnaissance he determined to cross his army at once, at the crossing a few miles above his adversary's right flank, just mentioned on the road leading to Decatur and Atlanta. After making a lodgment on the south side, he commenced moving over his entire army. As soon as this plan was sufficiently developed Johnston promptly withdrew his army across the Chattahoochee and bivouacked on the 9th of July, enmasse, awaiting the enemy's movements. As soon as it was developed that Sherman's entire army was crossing, he selected a position covering Atlanta on the south side of Peachtree Creek and partially fortified it.

At this date, July 18, an order came from the War Department at Richmond, relieving General Johnston of the command of the army, with instructions, for General I. B. Hood, promoted to the rank of general, to assume command. As all the preliminaries had been made for an attack on Sherman's army, as soon as it could be delivered, the three corps commanders, Hardee, Hood and Stewart, joined in a telegram, urging that the change in commanders, should not be made until after the impending battle. It did not avail and General Hood at once assumed command.

It may be in order to take in review the movements of these two armies in that celebrated campaign. With a finely equipped army at all times double in strength to that of his adversary, it has always occurred to the writer that had Sherman possessed the military genius attributed to him by his admirers, he should have



practically destroyed Johnston's army before reaching the Chattahoochee.

The writer is not familiar with the topography of the country north of the Etowah river for reasons given on Appendix A., but is more or less familiar with the comparatively open country south of the New Hope Church line. That country by its numerous roads and its open character was well adapted to the movement of large bodies of troops.

The troops of each army were Veterans and behind fortified works may be considered equal, man for man. Take an example—Johnston in falling back usually occupied the next good position, already selected and soon covered his command by strong field work. Sherman comes up and after proper reconnaissance, pushed his line up close to that of his adversary's and covers his command with equally as strong field works. Admitting Johnston's force as forty thousand effective, it will require Sherman to oppose him in trenches with forty thousand men. He has then an army of forty thousand men in reserve. There would be very little risk in making a night march with even thirty thousand of this reserve around to the flank and rear, and delivering a vigorous attack at daylight, on his flank and rear. Ordinarily such a movement vigorously made would result in a disaster to his adversary. To meet this rear attack Johnston would be compelled to withdraw a part or all of his troops from their entrenched line, Sherman's entrenched line would then advance and between the flank and rear attack, it would ordinarily result in a rout of his adversary's army. By a daylight attack there would be time enough to practically finish the job before night.

The Kennesaw line offered an admirable opportunity for such a movement, as the country in Johnston's front and left flank was by its topography suitable, but instead of making the movement with the large force at his command, it was made with a force inadequate to the job and instead of an attack in rear the attack was made against a strongly fortified line in front and flank and of course was a failure.

With his force, usually one-half of that of his adversary General Johnston's tactics were necessarily of a defensive character. His object was therefore to force his adversary to attack his forces when in a fortified position, as detailed heretofore. In carrying through this policy he was most successful, inflicting losses on his adversary, more than in proportion to the difference in the size of the respective armies.

Most certainly General Johnston retrograde movement from Dalton to Atlanta was wonderfully successful. There was not, in the evacuation of the many fortified lines, the loss of a single piece

of light artillery or the leaving behind a single sick or wounded soldier in that nearly three months of almost continual daily fighting. In all the battles in which detachments of his army were engaged they either inflicted bloody repulses or held their own.

No wonder General Johnston possessed the confidence and loyalty of his army from corps commanders to the man with the musket. No wonder this army was filled with grief and despondency when it was announced that its command was transferred from such an officer to an officer they knew little about, except as a gallant division commander of another army.

In the long and arduous campaign, a sketch of which has just been given, Hardee's corps received and gave back many hard knocks. In all the detached engagements in which its several divisions took part, the well earned reputation of the corps was fully sustained, the most important of which was the assault on the Keenesaw line, heretofore described.

There had been at all times perfect harmony and confidence between General Hardee and the General-in-Chief which found expression in frequent commendation of the judicious services of the former, in the management of his corps.

After General Hood assumed command the army occupied the line selected by General Johnston, on Peach Tree Creek, before alluded to. Hardee's corps on the right, with Stewart's corps on the left. Still further to the right was stationed Cheatham's corps (formerly Hood's), but with an interval of about a mile from Hardee's right.

Bate's division formed the right of the corps; Walker's division in the center; Cheatham's division commanded by Maney, on the left; and Cleburne's division as a reserve in the rear of Walker. As in most battles the attacking force does not move forward at the hour fixed upon and instead of one o'clock it was about four o'clock p. m. The enemy's line having a curved front Walker's division came into action first and was decisively repulsed by the enemy's fortified lines. Bate on account of dense brush in his line of march did not get into position for the attack until just before he ascertained from the writer, that Walker's division, on his left, had been repulsed, when the division was halted, as a further advance would only have caused useless slaughter. The writer was personally cognizant of the difficulties encountered in the advance of the division as he had made, in the forenoon, a personal reconnoissance of the ground and was ordered by Hardee to accompany and give direction to its line of advance. To those acquainted with the energetic activity of General Bate these details are not necessary, but are given as one of the records of the day's fight.



After Walker's repulse Cleburne's division was ordered to advance and renew the assault. Bate's division was then ready to co-operate. At this time a peremptory order came from General Hood for Hardee to send him a division to repel a threatened attack on the enemy on the extreme right of the Confederate line. Cleburne's division was the only one available and instead of making the assault, on the point of being delivered, it was withdrawn from the line of battle and sent two or three miles to the right rear. These details are given to account for any apparent delay in General Bate's division. Of course no further attack was made before night. At the time Hardee received the peremptory order for a division to be sent him General Hood was two or three miles to the rear and could not be communicated with and the situation explained to him (see the official reports of Hardee and Cleburne) and the peremptory character of Hood's order necessitated the sending off at a critical moment Cleburne's division.

On July 21st, General Hood planned an attack on Sherman's left flank and rear and selected Hardee's corps for the movement. This corps was by a night march by a circuitous route, to obtain a position on the enemy's left flank and rear and make an attack in the early morning. All night marches are necessarily slow and wearisome, to infantry. They must have time to rest, time to eat, and if possible time for a nap before going into battle. It is much easier to give an order for expeditious movements, than to execute them. That wearisome night march was no exception to the rule; the more wearisome than usual because this corps had been marching and fighting for thirty-six hours before this movement and it did not get into position and line up for the advance before 12:30 p. m. of July 22nd.

The extreme left of the Federal line made an angle with its main line, for nearly one half of a mile from its end on the McDonough road. At the McDonough road it was refused back at right angle to the road for a length sufficient for positions for a battery of artillery and its support.

All this face of the Federal line had been well fortified by substantial earth work.

The line of battle was as follows:—

✓ Cleburne's division was formed with its left resting on the McDonough road, extending two brigade fronts to the right, Lowry's brigade in reserve. On the left of Cleburne's division was formed Cheatham's division, General Maney commanding with its right on the McDonough road.

On the right of Cleburne was formed Walker's division, and still farther to the right was formed Bate's division on the extreme right of the corps.

In front of Bate and Walker and to a some lesser extent, in front of Cheatham and Cleburne, the advance was made through a thick oak brush (sometimes so thick as to prevent vision for more than fifty yards), which impeded the infantry very much and made it difficult and slow to keep up the alignment. Furthermore, in front of Bate was a large mill pond, so close to the Federal picket lines, as to have prevented its location being known with any exactness. This obstruction in front of Bate's division required additional time in passing around it.

From the preceding description of the formation of the opposing lines, it will appear that in front of Cheatham's division and Cleburne's division were well fortified lines of entrenchments. It will, moreover, appear that one brigade front of Cleburne and the full division fronts of Walker and Bate's division were directly in the rear of the Federal lines. These details are given in answer to the charge of General Hood, that General Hardee had not obeyed his orders in making an attack in the rear as well as on his flank. The position of Cheatham's division was the correct one, for had it been placed to the right of Bate's division, it would have left open an unobstructed route to the streets of Atlanta. As proof that one of Cleburne's brigades (Polk's) made a rear attack, is the fact that General McPherson of the Federal army, was killed by the advance line of this brigade.

The writer from personal knowledge of the battlefield on that day, is confident the above statement in regard to the positions of the divisions of Cleburne, Walker and Bate are substantially correct.

From the foregoing sketch of this battlefield it will appear, why the division of Cheatham and Cleburne, struck the enemy's line first, as it was slightly salient.

It is evident that the divisions of Cleburne and Cheatham would have the brunt of the battle to bear today. They would first come in contact with the enemy and would then have that fortified line to assault.

These divisions, in every battle in which they had heretofore been engaged had registered their deeds high on the scroll of fame for valor and all soldierly qualities and in all respects had proved themselves the peer of any division of the entire Confederate Army. They sustained their well earned reputation in today's battle.

On coming into contact with the enemy's lines they made their usually vigorous onslaught that in the end carried everything before them.

After several hours' fighting the two divisions had swept over the enemy's fortified lines for a distance of five hundred yards from the end, capturing eight (8) pieces of field artillery and a



good many prisoners. This success was, however, gained at the expense of heavy loss in killed and wounded.

For reasons given Walker's division did not come into action, along with Cleburne's division on his left. The latter's attack aroused the enemy and by the time Walker's was brought into action, a force had been shifted to confront him, large enough to check his advance.

General Bate, for reasons heretofore given, did not get into action as soon as Walker, giving still longer time for the enemy to confront him with a superior force. Each of these divisions held their positions for the remainder of the day.

In this day's battle at the front line of his division Major-General W. T. Walker fell, one of the heroes of the Mexican War, in one of whose engagements he had been desperately wounded. He was still hale and hearty and on the battlefield was enspired with the fire of youth.

Very close to the position where General Walker fell, Major-General McPherson, commanding a corps of the Federal army, was mortally wounded. He had many admirers among the Southern soldiers, because he made no war on non-combatants. He always bore himself as a soldier and a gentleman.

Although the flank movement of this corps was not, as decided a success as was hoped for, yet it was a decided victory and the only victory achieved by the army when under General Hood's command. Its fruits, on the second day, was the evacuation of their lines by the enemy for about one mile (as far as the Augusta railroad) and the abandonment of Sherman's plans to extend his lines any farther to the Confederate right.

General Sherman, checked on that flank, commenced extending his right towards East Point, the junction of the road to Macon and the railroad line toward Montgomery, Alabama, the latter line having already been cut by the enemy. His plan was, evidently, to get possession of the only source of supply of Hood's army and thus force the evacuation of Atlanta. Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee's corps was advanced to check this movement, but met with a decided repulse on the 28th of July. The Confederate fortified line was gradually extended on their left flank to cover this railroad. At the proper time Hardee's corps was transferred from the Confederate right to the left of Lee's corps to meet this extension of the enemy's right. This caused several engagements with parts of the corps. One particularly is recalled, with Bate's division, in which the enemy was severely punished.

On September 30th Hardee's left had reached a point several miles south of East Point. In the afternoon of that day the

writer was despatched to the front (to the west) to ascertain if possible, the enemy's movements and design.

Moving cautiously outside of our cavalry pickets he found a position in plain view, through the trees of a well worn public highway leading in the direction of Jonesborough, a railroad station on the road to Macon, Ga., about twenty-two miles from East Point. Just across the road, to the right was the usual smoke and the "hum" of the camp of a large body of infantry, probably a division. Along the road were the evidence of a battery of artillery having passed and the usual "stragglers" following a large column of infantry. This information was sent by a courier to General Hardee, in a written communication, the writer remaining for further observation.

On the return to camp he learned that General Hardee had acted on his information, had communicated with General Hood and had been ordered by him to start his own corps, with Lee's corps, to Jonesborough by a night march, he to precede them by rail, as soon as possible, and with the two corps attack the enemy and drive them off.

Cleburne in command of Hardee's corps followed by Lee's corps, at once commenced the movement. After night fall, when nearing Jonesborough, the head of the corps found the enemy in possession of the line of march. Cleburne at once dispatched the writer to Rough and Ready Station several miles to the rear, to communicate with General Hood, inform him of the situation and obtain further orders.

On account of the road being full of soldiers and a dark night it was about eight o'clock at night before that point was reached and communication with General Hood opened by telegraph. He replied that General Hardee was in Jonesborough—General Cleburne had found a route around the Federals and that the two corps were enroute to Jonesborough.

On account of the delay occasioned by this detour Hardee's corps did not get into position before nine o'clock a. m. on the thirty-first of August; and Lee's corps not until eleven o'clock a. m. A portion of Lee's corps left on picket did not arrive till one thirty p. m.

As it developed Sherman's entire force was in supporting distance of Jonesborough, except Slocum's corps left to threaten Atlanta.

The attack was not commenced until about three o'clock, p. m. Lee's corps on the right. This latter corps encountered a superior well entrenched force and was repulsed with heavy loss, that splendid soldier and gentleman Patton Anderson commanding a division receiving a fearful wound in the face. Cleburne was more fortunate, made a considerable forward movement encountering



several lines of battle. As the attack of Lee was not a success, Cleburne was drawn back to his original position; Lee occupying his original position.

On the night of August 31st General Hardee received a written order from General Hood directing him to send to him at Atlanta, Lee's corps, to be started at two o'clock a. m., of September 1st, as the indications were that Atlanta would be attacked on the 1st of September. This corps was promptly started on time, leaving Hardee's corps to confront an enemy that had repulsed the attack of the two corps the day before. This corps was, early on the first of September, extended in its formation to cover the front of the two corps and was weakened to that extent.

It is most extraordinary that General Hood, after giving positive orders to Hardee to attack the enemy in front of Jonesborough on the 31st of August, should on the evening of that day, before knowing the result of that day's fight, send another peremptory order to send him Lee's corps, one-half of his force, starting it that night. As telegraphic communication had been severed the day before, there was no other alternative but to obey.

Sherman, after feeling Hardee's position in the forenoon of September 2nd, in the afternoon, concentrated an attack on the extreme right of the corps, attacking Govan's brigade of Cleburne's division in such overwhelming force, as to practically "run over" that gallant brigade capturing about six hundred, among them that superb soldier, himself General Govan. Fortunately Gordon's brigade of Cheatham's division had been brought from the left; was promptly formed to retake the position captured and by a gallant charge, not only checked the further advance of the enemy but gained a part of the line lost. Fortunately night was approaching and the enemy did not take advantage of their superior force and follow up their success.

Single-handed this corps, by hard fighting, kept at bay four or five corps of the enemy. Hardee realized this was necessary to make possible the successful evacuation of Atlanta, which, a soldier's forethought taught him, was at hand.

Against such overwhelming odds Hardee realized there was only one recourse left him, the withdrawal of his corps under cover of night, four miles in the rear, to a position covering Lovejoy's Station. About nine o'clock at night whilst on this retrograde movement, a dull long-drawn-out roar was heard in the direction of Atlanta that announced the last act in its evacuation, the burning and destruction of about thirty car loads of ammunition and other ordinance stores. The explosion was very distinctly heard.

Hardee's corps was moved without molestation back to Lovejoy's Station, formed in line, selected and partially entrenched, before

the advance of Sherman appeared in front about nine o'clock the next morning, September 2nd. Their first attack was made and repulsed. Soon afterwards, without any apparent reason, the force in front was withdrawn back to the main body and Sherman withdrew his army back to Atlanta. After getting positive information of its evacuation he was satisfied with having "won the campaign," so he stated at the time.

Had the Federal commander possessed the military genius with which he was accredited, it should have been displayed in vigorously following up his success, either in following Hardee that morning, overwhelmed him by his superior forces or turned towards Atlanta and crushed Lee's corps and then Stewart's corps in detail. Instead of that he announced "the campaign won" and quietly retired back to Atlanta.

It is not considered best at this day, to enter into the details of the controversy between Hardee and Hood as to the responsibility for the failure of the military movements leading to the fall of Atlanta. Public opinion has pretty well settled down as to that question. It is believed to be conceded that Hood was lacking in that noble trait of character possessed by the great Lee, to a remarkable extent; that trait caused him to frankly acknowledge full responsibility for his own acts and not to lay blame on his subordinates. He even went further and sometimes assumed responsibility for failure of his subordinates. "It was all my fault, soldiers." This trait did not decrease the confidence and love of his army, but rather the contrary.

The details of the battles of July 20th and 22nd are given from the personal knowledge of the writer, merely consulting published records as to dates, at times. Those details controvert General Hood's charge, of disobedience of orders and want of proper energy in movements. In criticising Hardee's acts, he insinuates, though he does not charge, that Hardee "kicked and pulled back," so as to produce failures in movements, merely to spite him, Hood; in other words, charging him with disloyalty to that cause for which he cherished the highest love, for which those who knew never entertained the remotest doubt.

This criticism of the battle of July 22nd was made by the writer at that time. This plan was for the corps commanded by Cheatham occupying the entrenched line in Atlanta, opposite the Federal left, to have attacked it in front as soon as Hardee's corps was vigorously engaged. This movement of Cheatham's corps directly, under the eye of the Commanding General, was made soon after Cleburne commenced his attack and was made too soon and was repulsed before Hardee's corps was well engaged. Hood, under

whose eye the attack was made, is responsible for the premature attack.

It is understood General Hood does not find fault with General Hardee, as to the two days' fighting around Jonesborough, but the following dispatch to General Bragg indicates he places the failure on the men in the ranks, in the fight of August 31st. (See Volume VIII of Confederate History, page 142). The dispatch reading: "To let you know what a disgraceful fight our men made on August 31st, I give you the wounded in the two corps; Hardee's 539—Lee's 946. Killed, a very small number."

It would seem almost impossible (but for the high authority just quoted) that General Hood should have registered such a charge against the Veterans of Cheatham, of Cleburne, of Bate and Walker, and the Veterans of Lee's corps, after the records these veterans had written in blood on the pages of history, since Hood had succeeded to the command, on July 18.

This record taken from official sources reads: Killed, 1756; wounded, 10,267; total killed and wounded, 12,023. Time 45 days or six weeks.

Casualties from May 1, to July 18, during which General Johnston commanded the army: Killed, 1221; wounded, 8299; total for 79 days or two and two-thirds months, 9520.

What was the result of this six weeks of offensive campaign, as compared to Johnston's defensive plan. Answer. The loss of Atlanta; the loss of 12,000 gallant soldiers; the destruction of the previous high morals of this army and their utter loss of confidence in the military skill of the Commander-in-Chief. This was in evidence, on the review of Hardee's corps by the President, General Hardee and General Cheatham at Palmetto, when as they passed in front of one of the brigades of the latter's division, men cried out, "Give us back Johnston" repeatedly several times. The writer witnessed the incident.

In the fore part of this paper it is asserted that in all the battles of Hardee's corps when under his command, it never turned its back to the enemy, from Shiloh to the battles resulting in the fall of Atlanta, up to July 18, 1863. That assertion has been substantiated. On July 20th Walker's division alone was repulsed. On July 22nd the entire corps went forward and held its ground to the end. On August 31st Lee's corps could not accomplish impossibilities. Hardee's corps was successful until retired after Lee's repulse. On the 2nd of September Hardee's corps, single-handed, held its lines till night.

As heretofore noted the evacuation of Atlanta resulted in the loss of about thirty (30) carloads of ammunition and other ordnance stores. This train had been ordered as far as East Point



(there to await further orders) in ample time for its movement to a safe point farther South, but it appeared to have been forgotten by the officers responsible for its movement and when they awakened to the situation, it was too late, as the enemy had control of the railroad near Rough and Ready Station. This train was then moved to Atlanta and on its evacuation on the evening of September 1st, it was fired and destroyed causing the explosion that was heard on retiring from Jonesborough.

As this ammunition was of almost incalculable value to the Confederacy General Hood caused the matter to be investigated to determine which of his subordinate officers were responsible for this loss.

The following facts were elicited: General Hood had, through his chief of staff, given orders to the quartermaster in charge in ample time for its safe passage to the rear. It had been started and reached East Point there to await orders, as the enemy's movements were then uncertain. It then appeared to have been forgotten by the quartermaster in charge until the line to Macon had been closed by the enemy. The responsibility was thrown directly on the quartermaster, but at the same time the chief of staff was blamed, because he did not, through his staff, follow up the order until he knew it had been fulfilled.

Whilst the foregoing decisions were correct it did not free the commanding general from responsibility, for it was his duty, to an authority higher up, the President and people of the Confederacy, to have followed up his order through his staff officers until he knew such an important order was fully executed, if possible to be done. This was the usual custom of General Johnston, General Bragg and General Hardee.

This incident of the loss of the ammunition train is closely paralld by the controversy as to whether General Cheatham or who, was responsible for the failure to attack Schofield's corps as it passed at night on the Turnpike toward Franklin on Nov. 29th? Supposing the order was transmitted to Cheatham, of which there appears doubt, it was still paramount duty of the Commander-in-Chief, to ascertain that such an important order as a night attack, had been carried out before going to sleep. Subsequently after a full investigation the controversy ended by General Hood writing a frank and manly letter to General Cheatham exonerating him from all blame. A similar letter was written General Stewart the only other corps commander connected with the movement. Then it would appear that no one was to blame. (Affidavits, see Volume VIII. Confederate Military History, page 153—also Battle Sketches by B. L. Ridley, page 436).

After the evacuation of Atlanta Stewart's corps and Lee's corps

made a successful junction with Hardee's corps at Lovejoy's Station, but after the withdrawal of the enemy to Jonesborough and later to the former city.

Whilst the army was resting at this place, after a campaign, with almost daily fighting, for about six weeks, Sherman notified General Hood that he purposed the depopulation of Atlanta, for military reasons, and that he must prepare to receive all the old men, women and children that chose to go South. Against the sturdy protest of Hood he proceeded to carry out this inhuman and unnecessary order until its final completion. This whole proceeding was only equaled in inherent savagery, by a previous proceeding of this representative of a great government in loading into freight cars about 500 old men, women and children, the operatives of the cotton factory at Rosewell, Georgia sending them to Louisville, Kentucky, and turning them loose in a large city without money, food and bedding. Some of these children were found by their parents in Vermont after the war, and some never returned to their mothers.

On the 18th and 19th of September this army was transferred to Palmetto Station on the railroad line from Atlanta to Montgomery, preparatory, as afterwards developed, to the campaign into Tennessee in Sherman's rear.

During its halt here of ten days President Davis made a short visit. It was well known that Lieutenant General Hardee was unwilling to serve under General Hood because he believed him, though a tried and gallant officer, to be unequal in both experience and natural ability to so important a command. Since then General Hood had endeavored in his reports of operations around Atlanta to unload on to him the failures due to Hood's own blunders. This rendered his farther service under Hood impossible. The President must have recognized this and assented to his relief of the command of his old corps with great reluctance saying: "My assent to his persistent request to be relieved was finally given because of irreconcilable differences between himself and the officer commanding-in-chief."

He was then given command of "The Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida." He was allowed to take with him to his new command a good many of his old staff, the writer among them. He left at once for Charleston, S. C., his future headquarters, arriving there on October 5th.

General Hardee's new command was a very extensive one in area, but with only two important seaports, Charleston, S. C., and Savannah, Ga., around which were grouped most of the troops in the department. Charleston was the most important on account of its being a "blockade running" port, a line of light draught (six feet)

steamers up to its evacuation on February 18th making regular and successful trips to the British port of New Providence Island. This in spite of the close blockade by the Federal fleet.

Florida though of no strategic importance yet otherwise of very great importance because its "hammock" lands furnished most of the beef for the Confederate army.

The entrance to the harbor of Charleston was defended by Fort Sumpter a pentagonal fort of small area on a 'rip rap' foundation, located close to the main channel. It was constructed for three tier of guns with brick walls, the thickness of the walls and the artillery being of an absolute design, unsuited for the improvements in war implements of even that date. Fort Moultrie, across the main channel on Sullivan's Island was a necessary adjunct for the defense of this channel, the two forts being mutually protective. They had successfully defended this important harbor since the surrender of Fort Sumpter by Col. Anderson in the spring of 1861. As it developed in this siege, the strength of this fort was that the face of the pentagon bearing on the inner channel could not be attacked on the water front until the enemies iron clads came within an 800-yard range of its battery of 8-inch rifle cannon. On the sides facing Morris Island its batteries quickly made those batteries untenable.

After this face had been mounted with six 8-inch rifle guns the Federal fleet attempted with their most powerful ironclads to push farther enough down the channel to enable their heaviest rifles to operate on this interior face. After a notable engagement in which one of their ironclads, the Keo Kuk, was sunk and the others would have been but for their retirement. Despairing of success on this line of attack powerful batteries were erected on Morris Island facing the opposite side of the fortress, which was towards the last, threw rifled shells of 100 pounds and heavier. After getting the range of this three tier brick fort they pounded away night and day until the walls were a mass of ruins. It was told that the front and rear walls were penetrated at each shot. The garrison was not disheartened but as the ruins tumbled down on their heads, they proceeded to "burrow" underneath, making use of sand bags and timber and other material for walling up the interior. A little steamer made night trips for years to the battery in bringing in this material and other supplies. In the end "galleries" were formed inside with a timber stockade facing the interior, "loop-holed" for small arms, so that in case the enemy carried the fort by "escalade" the garrison could retire inside the galleries and kill or drive off their assailants. This attempt was made on a dark night by a superior force coming from the direction of Morris Island in row boats. A lodgement was made on the top of the now levelled brickwork, but the garrison



soon got in their work and the attack was repulsed, taking many prisoners.

These details are given as to Fort Sumpter because it is one of the most notable defences of a fortified position in history. After being under fire for almost four years with all modern implements of war, it was infinitely stronger at the time of its inspection by the writer than when the first projectile was hurled against it. The only two faces not exposed to their fire was that inner face with which the enemy had experimented with unsuccessfully and the Morris Island side, the walls of which had become so thick from the tumbling down of the brick work from above as to be impenetrable by their heaviest shells. Sumpter could not be reduced except by first reducing Fort Moultrie which could only be done by an attack from the land, which appeared to be too big a job to be undertaken.

It is not within the province of this sketch to give the details of military operations for the last few months of that four years' struggle for the independence of the South. In the interval preceding the commencement of Sherman's celebrated march of devastation towards the South Atlantic, General Hardee was informing himself through his staff of conditions existing in his new command. Among others the prospect for supplies of beef from Florida; an inspection of Federal prisoners of war, and the available strength of troops for military operations.

Sherman left Atlanta (after applying the torch to the part of that city that had escaped his attention) on November 15, 1864. As soon as it was developed that Savannah was his objective point on the Atlantic, Hardee gathered all the available forces that could be spared from other exposed points, (about 13,000 effectives, infantry and artillery), concentrated them at the latter point, covering the approach to the city on the northward side by strong field works, as soon as they could be constructed. Sherman reached his outworks in the first week in December protecting his command in similar fashion where necessary. It was absolutely necessary for Sherman to open communications with the Federal fleet blockading this coast, who had a large amount of supplies of all kinds for his army awaiting his arrival. Fort McAlister, a small but strongly fortified post, with a garrison of about 300 men guarding the mouth of the Ogeechee River, was in his path. After a sufficient reconnaissance Hazen's division of about 3,000 men was assigned the task of capturing this fort. After a vigorous defense it was carried by assault the enemy swarming over the works carrying it by escalade. This occurred on December 13th.

It required some little time for the Federal commander to refit his command with all necessary supplies, he in the meantime pressing his lines close up to his adversary's lines.

General Hardee was in close communication with the war department at Richmond and was given to understand the general policy to pursue, which was to save the troops and not allow himself to be penned up ultimately to surrender and to promptly vacate cities when necessary. This agreed with his own ideas and he had been quietly preparing for such a contingency, by having a pontoon bridge thrown across the several channels of the Savannah river.

General Foster commanding at Port Royal on the Atlantic had made several demonstrations, as if to close Hardee's outlet towards Charleston, but each time had been thwarted.

Sherman's army had been held at bay for about two weeks and the lines in front could have been held much longer, but that the demonstrations from Port Royal had become so threatening that Hardee made preparations to evacuate Savannah as soon as possible. Accordingly on the 21st of December, at night he evacuated all the posts, and withdrew his army with all the light artillery across the pontoon bridge and thence by a march of about twenty miles to the end of the railroad, at Hardeeville, leading to Charleston; the night being made lurid by the burning of the small naval fleet under Commodore Tatnall. The troops with the naval battalion reached the end of the railroad without mishap. Commodore Tatnall, now much past the meridian of life, somewhat stout, not at all cheerful after the loss of his ships, mounted on a very dilapidated looking horse, (had the situation not been so tragic), would have been a correct exemplification of the phrase of "a fish out of water."

At this time every train had to run the gauntlet of a Federal battery that had secured a position something over a half-mile to the right, but it is believed there were no casualties of consequence resulting from this bombardment of the trains.

The advance of Sherman's army from Savannah during January, 1865, caused the Federal fleet of Charleston to be quite active in making demonstrations along the Atlantic, as if threatening a landing; the most important one having been made at Bull's Bay, thirty or forty miles north of Charleston. These movements all developed into mere demonstrations. Sherman's march was only confronted by the cavalry under Generals Wheeler and Hampton and by a few remnants of the Army of Tennessee, that had survived that disastrous campaign.

When one wing of his army had reached Orangeburg, South Carolina it became apparent it was his intention to pass on toward the North East, thus isolating Hardee's forces at Charleston and preventing their junction with the different remnants of the Confederate Army under General Johnston in North Carolina. Acting under general instructions General Hardee had been gradually

preparing for the ultimate alternative and on February 13th all the posts around Charleston were successfully evacuated and he successfully withdrew his army through Florence and Cheraw, making use of the railroad to the latter point as much as possible for troops and material. His troops reached Cheraw on March 2nd, ahead of Sherman's advance and proceeded on its march through Fayetteville, North Carolina and thence to the vicinity of Smithfield (General J. E. Johnston, present head quarters), on the 17th of March.

In honor of the long and successful defense (four years) of this celebrated fortress the eight rifle guns of Fort Sumpter that had successfully repulsed the Federal fleet and remained intact at the evacuation, were not spiked.

The evacuation of Charleston necessitated the destruction of almost the last remnant of the Confederate Navy under the command of Commodore Ingraham, a name made memorable, in the old navy, by his resolute action in the famous "Costa" affair in the Harbor of Smyrna, for which that gallant officer received the thanks of the United States Congress. Captain I. N. Brown, also a noted officer of the old navy, commanded his flagship at that time. The burning and blowing up these ships, together with the burning of a few bridges, on that memorable night, made a scene long to be remembered.

Except for a slight engagement at Averysboro, North Carolina, on the 16th of March and a more important one at Bentonville, North Carolina, on the 18th of March, fighting closed until the surrender of this army on April 26th, 1865.

The successful evacuation of Savannah with all the impedimenta of a force of about 13,000 men on the point of being shut up, by a force of 60,000 men, was managed by Hardee with his usual skill and ability.

The successful withdrawal of the scattered detachments from Fort Moultrie, Fort Sumpter, the several forts around the inner harbor, and from the islands facing Morris Islands, occupied by Federal forces, was an achievement still more difficult of accomplishment. Yet it was done without a hitch or any friction and the troops delivered at the end of the railroad at Cheraw, South Carolina, in sufficient advance of Sherman to avoid an unequal encounter.

The slight engagement at Bentonville deserves more than a passing notice for at that encounter Willie Hardee was mortally wounded in the last charge of his regiment, the gallant Eighth Texas Cavalry—Willie Hardee, though a youngster under twenty years of age, had served on his father's staff as an aide-de-camp. Not long before that date he had received the consent of his father



to enlist as a private in the Eighth Texas Cavalry, a regiment that had served with distinction, with the Army of Tennessee since the fall of 1861.

At a critical moment in that Bentonville fight the enemy gained possession of a bridge from which it was important they should be driven. General Hardee being in the vicinity and realizing its importance rallied a small force and with the Eighth Texas Cavalry charged the enemy, regained the bridge and held it until a sufficient force arrived to hold it. In that charge Willie Hardee received his death wound. This was one of the saddest events of that four years of tragedies. Willie Hardee was a noble boy to whom the writer was much attached, the idol of his father and the inheritor of his name. To think that after passing through so many dangers (father and son) he should fall in the last hours of a war fought in defense of a cause, however dear it may have been, yet at that date had practically proven a failure.

After the engagement at Bentonville Sherman's army passed on to the seaboard where it was outfitted with supplies of all kinds and at once commenced a movement on General Johnston's army at Smithfield, the latter slowly retiring before him. In the meantime Richmond had fallen on April 2, Lee's army had been surrounded near Appomattox C. H., and surrendered to General Grant on the 12th of April. President Davis and his cabinet had retired to Danville and afterwards to Charlotte, North Carolina. Finally on the 26th of April General Johnston accepted terms from General Sherman, by which his army surrendered on the same terms as were granted to General Lee. Each soldier and officer were paroled and the remnants of the army dispersed to their several homes.

The war had closed.

The preceding sketch of that Western Army designated "Army of Tennessee" based on authentic records and upon personal knowledge of those details coming under the observation of the writer, shows the uniform success of the corps commanded by Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee, in all the battles and military movements of that four memorable years of conflict. In the campaign of 1862, 1863 and 1864, the divisions constituting this corps were partly changed each year, with different division commanders.

Though not familiar with the records of the several corps of "The Army of Northern Virginia," it is believed that no corps of that army has a higher record for continued success.

So then it would seem reasonable to suggest that Lieutenant-General Hardee, the commander of this corps should rank in military skill and ability with the most distinguished corps commanders of the entire Confederate Army. The writer has always classed

him with Longstreet, "Stonewall" Jackson, possibly may be given some precedence over each.

WILLIAM D. PICKETT.

March 20, 1910.

# APPENDICES

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## APPENDIX A.

During the following dates, the foregoing statements are not made from personal observation, as the writer was absent from duty on "sick leave."

For thirty days after retirement of the army from Shiloh, during which Halleck had closed in on Confederate lines, at Corinth in 1865.

From May 1st to May 30th, 1864, Atlanta. From March 2nd, 1865, to April 8th, 1865.

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## APPENDIX B.

### THE RE-ENLISTMENT OF JOHNSTON'S ARMY.

(Nashville Tennessean, Aug., 1909.)

Editor Tennessean:

Much has been said, as you doubtless know, relative to the re-enlistment of the Army of Tennessee, then under the command of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, at Dalton, Ga., in the spring of 1864, a short time before the advance of Sherman. I would like, through the medium of your paper, to say a word on the subject, as I think I know as much about the matter as any other person now living. You will pardon the declaration, as it is made with becoming humility and lack of arrogance.

It was a critical period in the history of the Confederacy. The two-year enlistment that had taken place while the army was at Corinth, Miss., just after the battle of Shiloh, was about to expire, and the summer campaign was soon to begin. The Confederate government was confronted by a serious question. Congress knew not what course to pursue or what measures to adopt to obtain a re-enlistment of the army. They did not know that the soldiers would submit to a second conscription, and a voluntary enlistment was the great thing to be obtained, if it be possible, and it was hoped that some movement tending to that end would be made by the soldiers, thus dispensing and doing away with all drastic



measures. At that time furloughs were being given to some of the Tennessee troops as many of them were anxious to go home before the beginning of the campaign, which every one knew and felt would be long and bloody. I was one of that number.

I had enlisted at Somerville, Tenn., early in the spring of '61 in the company of Capt. Johns, known as the "Avengers," which became Company A of the Sixth Tennessee infantry regiment, and after the battle of Shiloh, till the close of the war, was commanded by that gallant soldier and patriot, Capt. Robert C. Williamson, now deceased. At the date mentioned I put in my application for a month's leave of absence, technically termed a furlough. Of course it was to encounter a good deal of "red tape" and had to pass the scrutiny and approval of all the headquarters from the captain's on up to that of the commanding general.

When I appeared before Capt. Williamson with my application he remarked that this question of the re-enlistment of the army was now a serious one—that the whole army and country were being affected by it; that our superiors did not know how to dispose of it; that they did not know what steps to take in regard to it, and that the movement should be inaugurated and set on foot by the privates and subalterns in the army if they could in some way be prevailed on to do so voluntarily. He said that he did not know whether he could get me a furlough or not, but if I would agree to enlist for the war he would approve my application and take it up in person through all the channels as far as division headquarters, Gen. Cheatham then being our division commander, and that this prestige of re-enlistment would have, he had no doubt, a favorable consideration at the headquarters of our corps commander and also that of our commanding general; and that if I would agree to enlist he would also. After which he thought his whole company could be prevailed on to do likewise.

After pondering over the matter for a few minutes, for it was a serious one, I agreed to his proposition and we both went up to the headquarters of Col. George C. Porter, now of your city, who was then commanding the Sixth and Ninth consolidated regiment, and were sworn in by that officer "for the war," all of which he no doubt remembers, and is ready to verify. This was the first step that was taken in the re-enlistment of the Army of Tennessee for the war.

The re-enlistment of my whole company followed and before the sun went down the entire regiment had followed suit. This patriotic feeling soon became epidemic, and it was not many days before the whole army had agreed to fight it out to the bitter end, which was bitter indeed. The re-enlistment of the army was hailed

with delight at Richmond, Senator Ben Hill of Georgia exclaiming from his seat in the senate, "All honor to the Tennesseans."

This is a true and brief statement of the case, which, if necessary, can be fully proven. The seminal idea originated with Capt. R. C. Williamson of Fayette county, myself being the humble medium by and through which it was put into execution.

I deem it the greatest act of my life—one that the greatest, as well as the humblest—like myself—might well be proud. But I failed to get my furlough. Being unknown to you, Mr. Editor I beg leave to respectfully refer you to Col. George C. Porter, John P. Hickman and Gov. D. Porter of Nashville, Judge Bullock, Capt. Amos Jones and Capt. Turner, President of John Ingram bivouac of Jackson, Tenn.

E. M. SEYMOUR.

Orderly Sergeant, Co. A. Sixth and Ninth Tennessee. Maney's Brigade.

Jackson, Tenn., Aug. 6, 1909.

The above is a correct statement of the case.

GEORGE C. PORTER,

Col. Sixth and Ninth Tennessee.

## APPENDIX C.

In January, 1862, two cavalry officers, afterwards noted leaders in that army of the service, came to the front by daring deeds. N. Bedford Forest, of Memphis Tennessee, and John H. Morgan, of Lexington, Kentucky.

N. B. Forest then a captain, with his battalion of four companies of cavalry in the country southwest of Bowling Green, (the point not exactly remembered) attacked a full regiment of Federal Kentucky cavalry, routed them and followed them some distance. It being in Hardee's military department the report of the fight was made to his headquarters.

Forest was highly complimented for the distinguished gallantry displayed in this achievement which was understood to have been his first success and gave him a start in his wonderful career.

About the same time John H. Morgan, then a captain in command of one or two companies of cavalry performed a daring feat that first brought him to the front.

With thirteen or fifteen men he started from the vicinity of Bowling Green, made the circuit of General Buell's army at Munfordsville, obtained valuable information and brought back thirty

prisoners of war (thirty-three is my recollection) without losing a man. Of course, to accomplish this feat, required a good deal of strategy, nor could it have been done, except by a small body of picked men. Each man was first supplied with the light blue overcoat of the Federal cavalry. When in the neighborhood of the enemy this overcoat was worn. On approaching a picket post, they were approached boldly and confidently and at the proper time, they would be covered with their rifles and surrender demanded, with which they invariably complied. Small detached bodies were treated in the same way. When necessary he passed his command as Federal cavalry. This performance was successfully repeated, until by the time he had made the circuit, there were the number of prisoners as before stated. As they were turned over to headquarters to be sent to the rear there could not be much error in the number. This statement as to their adventures were told me by Morgan and his men. What astonished me still more was that these prisoners were extravagant in their praises of Morgan for the manner they had been treated as prisoners. I did not inquire of Morgan the cause of their praise, but suppose he trusted a good deal to their honor and gave them liberties.

Another similar incident occurred soon afterward. After the rearguard of the army occupied Murfreesboro, General Hardee understood that three hundred Federal cavalry had crossed the river at Nashville on the steamboat Minnetonka and more were expected to cross—he directed Morgan to burn it if possible.

The order was received on the 25th of January. On the 26th he left his camps at Buchanan with twelve men, passed through the Federal lines at Nashville and thence to the water front, discovered the steamer he was looking for, the Minnetonka, on the opposite bank, secured a skiff in which three men were sent, who boarded the steamer, drove off the roust-a-bouts in charge, fired the steamer and came back in safety. After waiting for the destruction of the boat, the party by a good deal of strategy, passed the Federal lines and reached camp at 12 o'clock at night, the only casualty being a wound received by Peter Atherton, one of his men. This was the substance of a written report. These two incidents of his early career brought him to the front and were merely the forerunners of those deeds of a similar character, with a larger command, that gave him a national reputation.

Morgan and General Hardee were good friends and the latter always effectively endorsed his claims for promotion. On John Morgan's marriage to Miss Reedy at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, just previous to that battle, General Hardee rode from his headquarters at Eagleville, on horseback about twenty miles, to be present.

General Hardee evinced the greatest admiration for the military



genius of N. Bedford Forrest. He has often expressed himself as classing him, as one of the few military genius produced by that war.

The writer cannot refrain from noticing the stories that have been told by so-called friends of this distinguished officer within the last few years of heated clashes that are reported to have occurred between him and other distinguished officers, sometimes with his own general-in-chief. In some of these stories General Forrest is represented as a ruffian and a bully. In other stories he is represented as guilty of such insubordination, that had he been a private soldier, his commanding general would have been justified by the articles of war in organizing a drum-head court-martial and had him shot before sun set.

General Forrest was too brave a man to have been a ruffian and bully and those who know him know to the contrary. He had too much love for the cause he fought for, to commit any act of insubordination, to his commander-in-chief, that if repeated, would cause so much harm to the cause. Those who published these stories only give themselves unenviable notoriety, for those knowing this distinguished officer disbelieve them. Forrest is not here to defend himself against these aspersions on his military and personal record. Let them be consigned to oblivion. There are too many scandal-mongers yet living at the North, who delight in repeating such stories.

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#### APPENDIX D.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL W. J. HARDEE

Born in Georgia, October 10, 1815

Died in Virginia, November 6, 1873.

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Married Elizabeth Douglas Dummett, St. Augustine, Fla., 1840.  
Four Children.

Anna D. Hardee, Chambliss

Sallie H. Hardee, Roy

Willie J. Hardee, Jr., killed at Battle of Bentonville, North Carolina,  
March 18, 1865.

Elizabeth D. Hardee, Gage

Second Wife

Mary F. Lewis, married 1863—Died, 1875.

No Children.

## APPENDIX E.

Greensboro, North Carolina, May 2, 1865.

In accordance with the terms of the Military Convention entered into on the twenty-sixth day of April, 1865, between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army and Major-General W. T. Sheridan, commanding the United States Army, in North Carolina.

Colonel W. D. Pickett, A. I. G., Hardee's corps, C. S. A., has given his solemn obligation not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obligation and is permitted to return to his home, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so long as he observes this obligation and obey the laws in force where he may reside.

W. J. HARDEE,

Lieut.-Gen'l C. S. A.,

Commanding.

G. F. TOOLE,

Major A. A. G. U. S. A.

Special Commissioner.

This is a copy of the original in my possession and is understood to be the same form of parole, as the parole given General Lee's army at Appamattax.

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 APPENDIX F.

It has not been considered necessary for the purpose of this sketch to include in it, the operations of the column of about forty thousand men under the command of Major-General George B. Crittenden (on the upper Cumberland) resulting in the Battle of "Fishing Creek" and the death of Brigadier-General Zollicoffer and many other gallant soldiers.

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